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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
No. 11-4231 
_________ 
 
 
STEVEN JEWELL, 
                              Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RIDLEY TOWNSHIP; ROBERT M. SMITH, JR.;  
ROBERT M. SMITH, SR.; LUIGI DISPIGNO;  
JOSEPH CERRONE; MICHAEL A. BONGIORNO;  
JERRY SCANLON, JOHN DOES 3-10 
 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-04947) 
District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
 
 _______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 18, 2012 
 
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: September 19, 2012 ) 
 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 This case concerns a tragic accident caused by an eighteen-year-old unlicensed 
intoxicated driver who refused to pull over for the police.  The pursuit ended when the 
drunk driver collided with a vehicle in which the plaintiff Steven Jewell was a passenger.  
Jewell suffered serious injuries, including paralysis.  He filed a complaint, naming the 
officers involved in the pursuit—Corporal Michael A. Bongiorno and Officer Gerard 
Scanlan (collectively “the Officers”)—and the Township of Ridley (“Ridley”) as 
defendants (collectively “the Defendants”),1
                                              
1 The complaint also named various other individuals as defendants, all of whom 
have been dismissed from this action.   
 and asserting claims under both 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 and Pennsylvania tort law.  Despite our sympathy for Jewell, we affirm the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.  
I. 
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and 
this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
the District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. 
v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment must be granted 
only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).    
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II. 
Background 
At approximately 10:45 PM on April 29, 2009, Ridley Township Police received a 
tip that eighteen-year-old Robert Smith, Jr. was driving a blue Hyundai Santa Fe while 
intoxicated.  Corporal Bongiorno, who knew that Smith did not have a valid driver’s 
license, and Officer Scanlan, who knew Smith from previous arrests, responded to the tip 
by driving in separate vehicles to Smith’s home.  While the Officers were sitting in their 
parked cars at the street corner, a blue Santa Fe approached with only the parking lights 
on.  The driver turned the lights off, passed directly by the Officers, and turned away 
down another street.  Upon recognizing Smith as the driver, Corporal Bongiorno began 
pursuing him with activated lights and sirens, and Officer Scanlan followed.   
Smith swerved throughout the pursuit, which wound through just over a mile of 
residential streets at speeds between fifteen and thirty-five miles per hour.  Neither Smith 
nor the Officers stopped at traffic signals or stop signs.  Suddenly, Smith accelerated to 
about forty-six miles per hour, ran a red light, and collided with a car in the middle of the 
intersection.  Jewell was a passenger in that car, and he suffered multiple injuries, 
including paralysis.  Smith’s blood alcohol level was 0.228, which is well above the legal 
limit.  
Both Officers had received basic pursuit training at police academies and also 
received additional training when beginning work in Ridley.  Cf. 37 Pa. Code § 203.1-
203.103 (outlining the administration of the Municipal Police Officers’ Education and 
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Training Program).  Both of the Officers were aware of the Ridley policy on police 
pursuits, which provides: 
SECTION 17: PURSUITS 
 
a. Notify Police radio immediately when initiating a pursuit. (State 
the reason) 
 
b. When notifying radio, state “Emergency Pursuit”.  When 
acknowledged by radio, continue as follows: 
 1.  Pursuit of vehicle 
 2.  Route taken by fleeing vehicle 
 3.  Description of vehicle and occupants 
       4.  Pursuing Police vehicle shall give radio its location            
periodically to assist other units in the apprehension.  
 
c. Only the Police vehicle initiating the pursuit may use siren when 
in visible pursuit of the fleeing vehicle. 
 
d. If Police vehicle in pursuit has lost visible contact with the 
fleeing vehicle, the operator shall notify radio of the last known 
location and direction of travel.  Police vehicle shall discontinue the 
use of the siren and reduce speed. 
 
e. If another Police vehicle resumes visible contact with fleeing 
vehicle,  operator shall notify radio and may take up pursuit using 
lights and siren.  
 
f. All pursuits shall be terminated when the violation leading to the 
pursuit is of such minor nature as to make a high risk of a pursuit 
unreasonable.  
 
g. The Commanding Officer on shift will evaluate and may 
terminate a pursuit at their discretion. 
 
h. Police vehicles are not to be used as ROAD BLOCKS. 
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J.A. at 686-87 (hereinafter “pursuit policy”).  Pursuits are further governed by the 
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code.  See 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6342 (requiring every 
police department to implement a written policy to govern motor vehicle pursuits).  
Jewell filed a complaint against Ridley Township, Corporal Bongiorno, and 
Officer Scanlan, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania tort law.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment for Ridley and the Officers, and Jewell 
appealed.   
III. 
Analysis 
A.  The § 1983 Claims 
 Jewell argues that Ridley violated his constitutional rights by its “failure to have 
an adequate policy in place governing police pursuits, its failure to properly train its 
officers in the conduct of such pursuits, and its failure to properly supervise its officers 
during such pursuits.”  Appellant’s Br. at 22.  The District Court granted summary 
judgment for the Defendants by holding, inter alia, that Ridley’s pursuit policy was not 
constitutionally inadequate and that Jewell failed to demonstrate that Ridley exhibited 
deliberate indifference through its allegedly inadequate training and supervision. 
1.  Pursuit Policy 
A municipality may only be held liable under § 1983 if the plaintiff identifies a 
municipal “policy” or “custom” that was the “moving force” behind the injury.  Monell v. 
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Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Bd. of Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. 
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997).   
Ridley’s pursuit policy does not precisely mirror the model policy suggested in the 
Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, but it was not the “moving force” behind Jewell’s 
injuries.  The pursuit policy provides that a pursuit “shall be terminated when the 
violation leading to the pursuit is of such minor nature as to make a high risk of a pursuit 
unreasonable” and that it is within the commanding officer’s discretion to terminate a 
pursuit.  J.A. at 687.  The Officers both understood the pursuit policy to require a pursuit 
to be terminated if it becomes unsafe.  The pursuit policy was thus adequate to alert 
officers to their duty not to engage in unreasonably dangerous pursuits.  We agree with 
the District Court that it was Smith who “was without question a danger to the 
community,” and that “[t]his unfortunate accident was caused by a drunk driver, not by 
an inadequate or deficient pursuit policy.”  J.A. at 19. 
2.  Training 
Jewell also argues that Ridley failed to adequately train its employees as to how to 
conduct police pursuits.  In City of Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that “the 
inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the 
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the 
police come into contact.”  489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989) (“Only where a failure to train 
reflects a ‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality-a ‘policy’ as defined by our 
prior cases-can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.”).  The Supreme Court has 
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also noted that “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is 
‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to 
train.”  Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011) (citation omitted). 
Although the Officers did not remember the details of the training they received 
about pursuits, both Officers were generally familiar with Ridley’s pursuit policy.  The 
Ridley Police had assisted pursuits in neighboring towns, but had not been the lead car in 
a pursuit for at least four years.  Without a pattern of constitutional violations during 
police pursuits involving the Ridley police, we cannot conclude that Ridley exhibited 
deliberate indifference in its efforts to train its officers when it provided enough training 
for its officers to be generally familiar with the pursuit policy.  Cf. id at 1363 (“[S]howing 
merely that additional training would have been helpful in making difficult decisions 
does not establish municipal liability.”).  We therefore agree with the District Court’s 
holding that Ridley’s training on police pursuits does not reflect deliberate indifference to 
the rights of persons with whom the officers come into contact, and that Jewell’s failure-
to-train claim fails.  
3.  Supervision 
 Jewell argues that Ridley is liable under § 1983 for its failure to supervise its 
police officers during pursuits.  A municipality may be liable for its failure to supervise 
only if it reflects a policy of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.  See 
Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126-27 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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Corporal Bongiorno—the supervisor in this pursuit—testified that he “will not do 
anything that’s going to put someone in direct risk” unless that person is “in a position 
that [he is] going to be able to hurt someone” because “those people have to be stopped.”  
J.A. at 153.  Corporal Bongiorno’s statements demonstrate his concern for the safety of 
the community at large, and that he knows to terminate a pursuit if it becomes too 
dangerous.  We thus agree with the District Court’s holding that Corporal Bongiorno did 
not act with deliberate indifference, and that Jewell’s failure to supervise claim fails.  
B.  The Negligence Claims 
 Jewell’s remaining claims arise under Pennsylvania state law.  Jewell argues that 
the Officers were negligent in the manner in which they carried out the pursuit while 
acting within the scope of their employment, and that the Officers and Ridley are 
therefore liable under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act and state 
tort law.  The District Court held, inter alia, that Jewell failed to demonstrate that the 
Officers pursued Smith without due regard for the safety of others, and therefore granted 
summary judgment for the Defendants.   
 The necessary elements for a negligence claim under Pennsylvania law are “a duty 
or obligation recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard 
of conduct; a failure to conform to the standard required; a causal connection between the 
conduct and the resulting injury; and the actual loss or damage resulting to the interest of 
another.”  Matthews v. Konieczny, 527 A.2d 508, 511-12 (1987) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claims 
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Act, local agencies are generally not liable “for any damages on account of any injury to 
a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any 
other person,” but an exception to this immunity exists for damages arising from “[t]he 
operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of the local agency” and 
caused by “the negligent acts of the local agency or an employee thereof acting within the 
scope of his office or duties.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8541 & 8542(a)-(b).  Therefore, 
all of Jewell’s state law claims require proof that the Officers were negligent.  
 Police officers are granted certain privileges under Pennsylvania law “when in the 
pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law,” which allow the officers to 
“[p]roceed past a red signal indication or stop sign . . . after slowing down as may be 
necessary for safe operation,” to “[e]xceed the maximum speed limits so long as the 
driver does not endanger life or property,” and to “[d]isregard regulations governing 
direction of movement, overtaking vehicles or turning in specified directions.”  75 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3105(a)-(b).  These privileges only apply when the vehicle’s audible 
and visual signals are in use, see id. § 3105(c), and they do not relieve the driver of “the 
duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.”  Id. § 3105(e). 
Here, the lights and sirens of Corporal Bongiorno’s car were activated during the 
pursuit, and the speed of the pursuit did not exceed thirty-five miles per hour until the 
final moments when Smith suddenly accelerated.  The Officers had reason to believe it 
would be dangerous for Smith to continue driving because they suspected he was drunk 
and had personally observed his erratic driving.  Considering all of the evidence in the 
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light most favorable to Jewell, we conclude that the pursuit was conducted in conformity 
with the Officers’ duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons.  
Accordingly, the Officers were not negligent during the pursuit, and Jewell’s state law 
claims fail as a matter of law.   
IV. 
Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the Defendants. 
